flowchart LR
W[Workflow request] --> P[Trusted policy]
P --> G[Effective grants]
G --> B[Backend enforcement]
This is an accepted design summary, not implemented enforcement. PLAN.md, especially D-018 through D-022, owns decisions. The current checkout has no working sandbox. Report software vulnerabilities through SECURITY.md.
Assume repository code, workflow definitions, actions, dependencies, and build scripts may be malicious on a single-user machine. Hostile multi-tenant operation is deferred. Protect ungranted host files/credentials, host services/control interfaces, policy/enforcement state, other runs’ private state, and availability within declared limits.
A workflow requests capabilities. Machine-owner or CI-administrator policy authorizes grants. The backend enforces the granted access and remaining denials. Repository configuration cannot silently authorize its own requests. Missing enforcement blocks execution before workload code runs.
Components use explicit typed imports with no ambient filesystem, network, environment, secret, credential, or native-process authority under the default policy. The runtime and host enforce the contract, including capability delegation through composition and resource/lifecycle limits. A native process launched through a host function does not inherit Wasm containment automatically. Concrete runtime, WASI version, and initial host interfaces remain open.
Existing tools use a separately isolated Linux backend. First targets are Linux jobs from macOS and Linux machines; macOS needs a VM-backed Linux environment. Whether Linux also requires a VM outer boundary is still a proposal. No unrestricted host execution is an automatic fallback.
Filesystem views, network access, processes/descendants, credentials, host/daemon access, resources, and cleanup require enforceable contracts. Job supervision preserves explicitly shared state while steps retain their own grants. Shared files can carry malicious state across those boundaries.
Bun is the intended GHA JavaScript compatibility runtime inside this system boundary. Neither Bun nor a bundled Bun executable supplies Wasm containment. Descendants, filesystem views, network, credentials, and cleanup must remain governed by the system contract. Runtime incompatibility does not authorize wider grants or automatic replay. See D-024.
An explicit owner-authorized profile/wildcard may grant broad runner access. It never activates because a permission check failed. Reports identify the effective profile and grants; broad access cannot claim the default policy’s narrower protection.
The proposed scope is the managed runner, keeping the personal host and policy/control interfaces
outside the grant. That scope is not yet confirmed. Syntax and activation granularity are also open;
--allow '*' is an illustrative proposal, not an available CLI option.
A wildcard does not create credentials, change GitHub token permissions, release protected secrets, implement missing workflow semantics, or turn native tools into components. Only explicitly supplied credentials can be made available under the eventual policy.
Granted read access plus an outbound channel can permit data exfiltration. Endpoint allowlists alone do not prove data-flow safety. Containment, signatures, and content digests do not establish truthful results, safe artifacts, or complete GitHub Actions compatibility.
Before making security claims, test denied host-file/credential access, host/control-socket probes, path/symlink/archive traversal, poisoned shared state, resource exhaustion, and descendant cleanup. Test positive grants and broad-profile authorization separately. Document trusted runtime/host/image components and residual vulnerability assumptions. No performance or absolute-security guarantee.
Primary mechanism references: Component Model, Wasmtime security, and GitHub credential/security controls.
Trusted policy separates acquisition, execution, cache, scheduling, telemetry and reporting authority. Cache preserves verified pinned objects without mandatory upstream checks. Known local revocation still blocks use. Offline revocation freshness is explicit policy rather than an implied real-time guarantee.
Package staging/extraction, shared-object leases and controlled tool views must resist poisoning and cross-run modification. Evidence keeps signing authority outside workloads. A signed claim requires receiver trust/verification and cannot establish truthful arbitrary tests.